Introduction
It is a matter of debate whether, since 1994, South Africa has become a stable democracy or whether it is a state experiencing crisis. Critics point to the increasing gap between rich and poor: presumably an indication of 'crisis'. It has also been acknowledged, however, that the ANC in government has had some success in building the nation in such a way as to obscure these socio-economic faultlines 2 and has thus achieved 'stability'. 1 The research for this paper was conducted as part of a project, funded by the UK's ESRC (award reference number R000239795), entitled 'Property, community and citizenship in South Africa's Land Reform Programme'. Thanks to all whom we interviewed; to family members and friends who offered help and support; to Belinda Bozzoli of the School of Social Sciences at the University of the Witwatersrand for helping to facilitate the research; and to the organizers of the conference on State and Society in South Africa held at Wits University in 2003, for providing the opportunity to present this paper. One of the areas in which this debate has been played out most vigorously is that of land reform. Restoring or redistributing land to the African majority has been seen by some as a meaningful way to address the plight of the poor. Taking place largely in the pages of the press, the debate has counterposed those, outside the government, who are critical of the misguided emphasis and slow pace of reform, and those, within it, who
issue press releases and offer facts and figures to demonstrate that real headway is being made.
It is instructive, however, to shift focus from the national level and examine how these contests play out locally. Within local settings, dissatisfaction at the slowness of reform, instead of being focused on the government or the ruling party, is levelled instead at those whom these reforms have already benefited. Conflicts develop between 'havenots' and 'haves': in this case, owners of land and those who have settled on it as tenants (or 'squatters'). In the process, each side draws on repertoires advocating, or contesting, forms of moral good. Two contrasting views of citizenship become apparent, both of which were espoused by the ANC at the time of the elections. One is grounded in the restored ownership of private property, while the other highlights the rights of all citizens to be equal.
During such contestations, there has been a tendency by local people, especially those in the tenant category, to think of the state as indivisible from the ruling ANC. Some light is thrown on this blurring of boundaries by a recent overview of politics and the state in third-world settings. The authors suggest a detailed examination of the means through which a political party dominates the state: of how, for example, politicians manipulate or intervene in state functions in order to build support. 3 In some settings, like those where favours are done or money changes hands, this is assumed to be a sign that the state is weak. But where politicians simply act so as to demonstrate their mindfulness of the needs of -or the promises they made to -their constituents, the state is assumed to be a strong one underpinned by a healthy democracy. Although the differences between the two seem clear, it may often be difficult to distinguish between such instances in practice. This is especially true where the political party using state apparatuses to build support is -as in South Africa -answerable to supporters from different classes or socio-economic groupings, thus needing to bear in mind separate, even contradictory, demands. These considerations make it more complicated to establish whether, within local contexts, the state can be seen as 'in crisis' or 'stable'.
If one aspect of state/party blurring is politicians' use of state instruments to pursue political objectives, another is the converse: the process in which local constituents manipulate or reconfigure parties' political agendas or ideologies to fit their perceptions of how politicians, via the state, ought to be delivering on their election promises. The present chapter explores both of these in relation to the case of the Doornkop, an
African-owned farm in Mpumalanga.
What is at stake here -as in similar scenarios elsewhere -is a contest over values and modes of social being. This contest goes beyond the specific matter of rights to land:
land symbolizes other things. When tenants stake their claim to land, they are stating a sense of entitlement to welfare, security, and a variety of forms of protection which, they assert, the state has a duty to provide. In the process, they have 'remoulded' national political agendas to make them fit with such claims. The ANC which the farm's owners supported from a time well before Mandela was incarcerated on Robben
Island has been locally reshaped, by its tenants, as the party representing their interests and hence opposing owners' ones.
The Doornkop owner/tenant conflict thus illuminates two aspects of local level politics.
It tells us not only how politicians manipulate state functions, but also how local constituents reshape political parties. This, in turn, throws some light on recent analyses of post-transition South Africa which highlight the ANC's difficulties in reconciling the interests of its richer and poorer constituents. Writers point to how the party's ideological nation-building project has attempted to downplay 'the socioeconomic faultlines in our society'. 4 Emphasising racial and nationalist unity is an attempt -often unsuccessful -to hide these faultlines. 5 How far, ask another set of commentators, can the economic consequences of embracing competitive market capitalism, with its inequalities in the capacity to generate wealth and own the means of production, be mediated by a political system that promotes equality and egalitarian rights? 6 Although such analyses point to a seemingly irresolvable tension between these principles contained within a single political party, popular political interpretation provides a means to resolve the tension, as the case of Doornkop reveals. The ANC, having promised equal rights at the election, has been reshaped locally as the party of the poor and landless, while the ANC-supporting title-holders -whose land rights were restored to them and who thus embody the inequalities inherent in private property ownership -have been redefined in the popular imagination as supporters of the political opposition.
It may, then, be misguided to try to establish whether the South African state/party configuration is 'in crisis' (by highlighting socio-economic faultlines) or 'stable' (by seeing how far these faultlines have been blurred through the party/state's nationbuilding project). The paper shows that local perceptions of party and state, constructed in the course of owner/tenants conflicts on African-owned land, represent a kind of 'manufacturing of consent' by the landless themselves.
Land Reform in South Africa
Although land reform was underplayed by many of those in South Africa's liberation movement who were gearing up to take their places in the new government, its importance was emphasised by some within the exile community and several networks of activists inside the country, as well as by the rank-and-file landless. The existence of these broader demands was not ignored during the design of the program. Largely as a result of input from land NGOs and human rights lawyers, there was early recognition that people with 'lesser' or 'informal' rights had been living on African-owned land and that their land hunger would need to be satisfied. Indeed, it was these activists' work with owners -dispossessed titleholders -which first alerted them to tenant needs and demands. According to some, the land NGOs concentrated on the victims of 'black spot' removals, 12 but the owners of these farms were not the sole beneficiaries of such efforts. In the Eastern Cape, for example, the plight of tenants on African-owned land were often at the forefront of NGO attention.
Practical experience with tenants' problems translated into theory and later into policy when the land reform program was designed. In the deliberations and published writings of human rights lawyers, much attention was given to the problem of different Analyzing these sentiments, the report states that 'this philosophy stands as a reproach to free market ideas which encourage people to forget about community'. 14 The report reveals an assumption that for title-holders to have refused to accommodate evicted farm workers would have been to fly in the face of African concepts of community. Such assumptions about African communality came to be enshrined at the heart of land reform, and eventually to be codified in the new property-owning 'legal entities' to which land was restored. Idealistic as these notions may sound, lawyers recognized the need to set limits. The fact that individual African-owned farms had originally borne the brunt of immense population pressure, such as resulted from the large-scale farm labourer evictions of the 1960s and 1970s, had been a kind of unhappy accident: it was now acknowledged that these farms, once restored, should not again have to absorb evicted people. By the time Gilfillan began to work as Mpumalanga Province Commissioner she conceded that, if former tenants had rights, it might be fairer to restore these through broader processes of land reform, than to honour them on the African-owned farms where the tenants had once resided. It might be necessary to 'exclude' people in order to avoid re-establishing the chaotic situations which had often developed on African-owned land. 16 In the face of the practical realities of ensuring land access, this position privileges the 'private' dimension of ownership over the 'communal ethic'.
The main policy solution for satisfying the land hunger of former African tenants, as of many other landless people without demonstrable rights, was through an individual government grant. This was known as the Settlement Land Acquisition Grant (which translates into the unhappy acronym SLAG). It is based on, and equivalent to, the government's urban housing grant, and was initially set at R15,000 and later increased to R16,000 per household. Since grants could be pooled and used to buy land they would, in theory, make for equality between those who had formerly held recognizable land rights and those who had held 'lesser' or 'informal' rights -or no rights at all. A number of other solutions emerged. As time went by and the policy of restitution became more finely-tuned to recognizing such rights, it was proposed to start restoring farms to former tenants on African-owned land alongside those of the title-holders themselves. At the time of writing, this option was being explored in the case of the recently restored farm of Kromkrans in Southern Mpumalanga. But Doornkop had been restored before any of these options had been thought through.
Before continuing to explore African owner/tenant relationships, it should be pointed out how these complicated the conceptualisation of land reform and its purpose. 'Private property' had been thought to pose a problem, but it was assumed that it would be the interests of white owners which might derail the program. 
Owners and tenants: the broader context
To outline the history of African owner/tenant relationships in South Africa's rural areas is to examine the origins of a basic faultline in South African black society. Early in the 20 th century, a division was established between a class of better-off longer-urbanized and 'respectable' people and an underclass of poorer people, usually arriving later in towns.
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In the case of the former Natal (now KwaZulu Natal), a study by Marks outlines the rural relationships which lay at the basis of this division. These were relationships between African landowners and the peasantry who, displaced from its former landholdings by white farmers, increasingly sought refuge as tenants on these owners' land. As these tenants were pressed into labour migration in cities, so the farms on which they paid rent to live were gradually transformed from agricultural sites into residential reserve areas. This picture is accurate in broad outline. But not all tenants displaced off white farms relocated on African-owned ones. Initially, the prospect of settling on such farms or even eventually purchasing land on them seemed more promising than that of resettling in the homeland areas which were more remote and less hospitable. But increasing pressures brought to bear by the state on the inhabitants of African-owned farms -owners and tenants alike -meant that tenancy on such farms was merely the first step on a longer road that led inexorably to the African homelands. Although the infamous 'black spot' removals were the most extreme and punitive means used to accomplish this, they were by no means the only ones.
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Owner-tenant relationships were shaped by the struggle against these removals: a struggle which reached its height during the 1960s-70s but assumed different forms in different regions. In some cases, like that of Daggakraal in Eastern Mpumalanga, tenants, although being disparaged by some, were seen by others as a valuable source of income. They later supported the fight against removals and became part of the radical anti-apartheid Civics movement. Indeed, the strength of this united resistance on the farm Daggakraal was one reason why the removals were never, in fact, accomplished. 26 Even in cases where resistance was eventually quashed, such as in Natal (now KwaZulu Natal), owners helped tenants in allowing them to move onto their land 'at the last minute' so that they could then legitimately claim land after relocating in the new 'removal' townships. 27 In other cases, in contrast, members of the two groupings were brought into conflict by the threat of removal. Tenants and owners were left on either side of the political fence. great loss of employment and disruption, but the social differentiation (even within the titleholder group) which it augmented -between white-collar, middle-class city dwellers and blue-collar migrant workers remaining on the farm -was already far advanced. After the farm's official reoccupation in 1994, these differences re-emerged.
They became manifest in the division between rank-and-file and leadership: those resettling on the farm were mostly poorer, but tended to rely on members of the middle class -who did not resettle there -to represent their interests. The differences were also reinforced by divisions between diehards and modernizers, and -most important for this paper -between those opposing and accepting the re-emergence of tenancy on the farm.
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During a visit to Doornkop in 2002, almost a decade after some of its owners had reoccupied it in 1994, we discovered that embryonic tensions over the question of tenancy, evident during an earlier visit in 1996, had focused themselves in the interim.
Restored owners' antipathy towards the idea of tenancy had formerly been little more than a generalized repugnance. It was born out of a memory that the state had used the unsanitary conditions in which the farm's then huge tenant population was living as a justification for the removal of the entire community, owners and tenants alike; and out of a fear that similar conditions might lead to state interference in the future. In December 1999, the Parliamentary Portfolio Committee on Land Reform visited Doornkop, among other places, to investigate delays in land reform. At the time, there were a few squatters living on the farm who had been brought there by the South African National Defence Force (SANDF) to whom the farm still officially belonged despite its having been 'given back' in 1994. Although Doornkop's residents had agreed to let the squatters stay there as an interim measure until they could be re-housed, they took this opportunity to question the delays in removing these unwelcome visitors. The Mpumalanga Province MEC for Housing, who was attending the meeting on behalf of the province, made a public statement to the effect that 'Africa is for everyone'. His remarks were interpreted as meaning that the government had recognized squatters' rights and given them equal status to that of owners. Rumours of his speech spread like wildfire, and within a short time several hundred households had moved onto the farm and built shacks there. Certain of the legitimate residents then took advantage of the situation to charge rent to the new arrivals.
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Statements by owners variously emphasised the relative entitlement of the new occupierssome of these Ndebele are people who have come back. When they arrive, they point to their marupi (original sites) and go there.
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-or the groundlessness of their demands to be recognized as rightful occupiers - The ensuing disputes, like earlier ones, evoked emotive memories of apartheid. Picking up on the Housing MEC's statement that the land of Africa should not be kept for the exclusive use of any particular group as it previously had been for whites, the moral case for the squatters centred on their poverty and landlessness, and tapped into local memories about Ndebele dispossession. But, although many of these shack-dwellers were indeed poor, not all had been driven to the farm out of dire necessity in the sense of having no alternative place to settle. Some had elected to move there from the nearby township of Mhluzi, adjoining Middelburg, in a desire to avoid paying expensive rents and service charges. Others, having moved from one squatter area to another around the district, had been attracted to this specific farm by the promise of farming land where they could plough, keep cattle, and enjoy the benefits of the life they had known earlier, while working on white farms. Most surprising of all, one woman, whom we met while she was single-handedly building a shack out of mud bricks, already had a six-room brick house in the KwaNdebele homeland, but needed a house in Doornkop as a kind of pied-a-terre so that her husband could more easily visit her during his weekends off. Squatting, rather than necessarily being a last resort, is often preferred because it allows proximity to work and access to food garden sites, and provides a relatively mobile and flexible option for short-term residence for those not wishing to make long-term investments in housing.
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These people had apparently settled on the farm with the randomness often attributed to squatters, who flock to empty land like 'birds in the cornfield'. 41 But many were in fact linked to the original tenants, and to each other, through ties of kinship which corresponded with those of ethnicity. When it became a matter of common knowledge At Doornkop in the 1970s, Pedis who were the legitimate owners of the land had given hectares to Ndebele who were renting those places. When the government decided to move people away from Doornkop, it was only the owners whom they evicted, because they were the ones resisting. They did not have a problem getting the bahiri (tenants) to move. Now, the new system allows only the owners to return. But through the historical understanding, the Ndebele also returned, because they used to stay there as well.
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But the full story of Doornkop's squatters goes beyond this. As already mentioned, several of them had no specific basis -ethnically or in terms of kinship or prior occupation -for a sense of entitlement to this particular site. And for those who did have such a sense, asserting it was merely one among a series of strategies deployed within the district overall. Ever since the mid-20 th century, people evicted from white farms in the The story of Doornkop's squatters is emblematic of many similar situations elsewhere in the country. It is the story of a loose agglomeration of people at whose core is an ethnically-defined group seen as an underclass not only viz-a-viz white society but also in relation to other African groups. On the basis of a sense of historical and moral entitlement, they have laid claim to land and in so doing have become the fulcrum for a further concentration of the disenfranchised and 'landless'.
Owners are divided between the view that such problems would never have arisen had tenants been excluded from the outset, and the view that tenants -'the landless' -ought to be allowed to stay in the interests of fairness and egalitarianism. In the midst of all this disagreement, the situation is fraught with promises of conflict, some of which have been actualised in violent confrontation. Owners complain about thefts and assaults by squatters: squatters have been assaulted and their houses burnt or destroyed by owner vigilantes; and they, in turn, mutter darkly about various forms of possible retaliation.
Much of the blame has been laid at the door of a state policy implemented too soon with too little proper planning. Doornkop, it is argued, represents a very early stage in the restitution process; much has subsequently been learned from the mistakes. Had the farm been earlier 'developed', larger numbers of people from within the legitimate owner fraternity might have moved back, leaving less room for tenants. Alternatively, or in addition, had tenants' needs been taken into account from early on, land might indeed have been set aside for them as has been done in other more recent cases like Kromkrans, further to the south-west. Furthermore, had the farm been transferred more speedily from the hands of the state into those of the former owners -a matter which took several years to accomplish -the squatter problem might not have arisen in the first place (the first group of squatters had been dumped on the land by SANDF, which owned it before its restitution). Or, once squatters did arrive, owners would have felt entitled to assert their recognized property rights and to control the problem by requesting police assistance to evict the squatters. While these mistakes have informed the further development of national-level restitution policy elsewhere, rectifying them in the case of Doornkop has been left to vigilante action, to various actors within local government structures, or to the consultants they employ.
Could the somewhat abstract solutions proposed by the human rights legal fraternity (and mentioned earlier) have solved owner-tenant conflicts in a specific case like the one described here? These lawyers had made concerted efforts to balance the principles of private ownership with its corollary of exclusiveness, against those of communal property with its more egalitarian connotations. It is undoubted that they recognized the possibilities of conflict over land under either regime, as can be gathered from this statement by Durkje Gilfillan, the human rights lawyer mentioned earlier who became Land Claims Commissioner for Mpumalanga:
property is, ultimately, about mediation … After vesting the rights, how you enforce those … is sheer negotiation.
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The need to balance exclusion against egalitarianism, and to solve disputes through negotiation, were here acknowledged in principle. But in the particular case under present consideration, especially after changes in the Department of Land Affairs post-1999, neither structures for the clear 'vesting of rights' nor for 'mediation' were in evidence. And, according to arguments proffered by the human rights fraternity, the broader context of state policy had in any case changed since the turn of the 21 st century.
Within a framework privileging the interests of 'owners' overall, policy now seemed to be geared particularly towards ensuring the prosperity of commercial African farmers.
Given this new policy direction, commentators have shown that attempts to downplay divisions between South Africa's rich and its poor have become increasingly less credible. As inequalities of wealth intensify, so 'rights talk' in its most egalitarian sense becomes less convincing. 'manufacture consent' is to fail to grasp the importance of local political contexts in which land access plays a crucial role. The poor and landless, so inadequately served within the current climate, have some capacity to reshape political imperatives. The ANC has attempted to 'take control' of this reshaping process by responding to it, partly through tapping into regional/ethnic contexts. Indeed, the story of Doornkop's squatters
shows that the party's tendency to centralize, rather than representing an inclination to ignore local imperatives, may have been forced upon it by them.
In the respective condemnations and justifications of tenancy expressed by those we interviewed, the moral positions adopted were, not surprisingly, closely linked to perceived material interests. As a result, they did not always coincide with the owner/tenant division. Those members of the owning community who had fewest options for making a living outside the rural context were most ready to 'sell' or let plots, and their expressed views echoed those of tenants: that land should be available to all rather than being privately owned, and hence that the basis for owner exclusivity was invalid, since this went against the promises made at the 1994 election.
The opinions of tenants on the morality of tenancy scarcely differed from those of the few owners who had invited them onto the farm. Lekwetše Ratau, for example, was one of a small number of owners who had been chided for letting land out to tenants, while Joseph Kunene, considered the major offender against the tenet of exclusivelyowned property, had been assaulted and (unsuccessfully) charged for similar but much more pervasive practices. Indeed, he had 'sold' several hundred plots on the farm. Doornkop is a private land -a bought land -like any other land that has been bought by a farmer. You cannot just enter a farmer's place and say 'it's a democracy'. They have got this wrong. They are trespassing -this is private property.
The Ndebele came here because South Africa got freedom and democracy, and this implies that they must also have access to a living place in case they need it … They came here also because the conditions on the farms where they used stay are bad.
Before 1974, bahiri (tenants) were predominantly Ndebele, but now we have lots of other ethnic groups also coming from nearby farms. People who used to accommodate bahiri were referred to as dinokwane (traitors) because Doornkop is a private property and therefore bahiri were trespassing.
As revealed by his testimony, those willing to dispense or let land to tenants during the pre-1974 period had been disparaged as much as their present-day counterparts. But then as now, admitted Mohlala, the occupiers of Doornkop best able to use its productive resources were these tenants. By way of proof, he gestured towards the shack-dweller 50 Joseph Kunene, Doornkop, 8 November 2002. 51 Ephraim and Fanie Mabuza, Doornkop, 6 November, 2002. area, where the most temporary of corrugated iron dwellings were flanked by well-built cattle byres stocked with beasts and surrounded by the verdant growth of this year's vegetable crop:
The Ndebele people who grew up here might be able to do farming. And they are best placed to do it -they have experience, since they have lived on farms for many years.
53
In disputes about who had the greatest entitlement to live on the farm, its absentee owners or the squatters with their immediate material needs, ideas of morality merged with those of custom and culture. Measured against the promises made by the ANC during its election campaign, squatters perceived it as unfair to allow one group of privileged people to own land of which they clearly had no need, while another group was being denied land despite being much better placed to use it.
Land and Politics
Strongly-held tenant views that the ANC promised 'land for all' have been translated into concomitant threats of withdrawing voter support: 'If they chase us from here, I
will never vote again '. 54 This is accompanied by a recognition, among those owners who have derived financial benefit from 'selling' land, that the restitution process, although beneficial only to a few, had been undertaken with electoral backing of the broader population: 'We got this land back through other people's votes'. 55 Political considerations of this kind lie at the basis both of the local reshaping of political ideologies and alignments mentioned earlier and, perhaps paradoxically, of increased party centralization at national level.
Where landowners like the original buyers of Doornkop had formed the core membership of the ANC in its earlier incarnation, the exclusionary attitude of some of them, and their refusal to let their land be used for the 'greater good', was now leading to their being recast, at least from the perspective of squatters and those 'selling' land to them, as supporters of the opposition DA. The ANC, in contrast, had been recast as coterminous with the tenants/the Ndebele, and was thus being envisaged as the party of the common people, intent on defending the landless and the poor. That the ANC was locally seen as the party of the poor was confirmed by our discussions with one of the owners. Titleholder and land-seller Lekwetše Ratau identified herself, unlike her better-off counterparts, as an ANC sympathiser, on the grounds of her fellow-feeling for the Ndebele:
The ANC people here are those who come from the farms -those who have been chased away from the farms -the bakgopedi (those who ask). They should not be called bahiri (tenants): the law does not allow that label as these people are also landless and are asking to be accommodated. I feel that these people must be allowed to stay. But most people from Doornkop are not in sympathy with these farm-dwellers. Equally underlain by suspicions of conspiracy, and displaying similar levels of conviction, was the opinion of squatter leader Jan Masina. He informed us that the predominantly white/Afrikaner DA was using Doornkop's property owners to do its dirty work for them: to help get rid of squatters in the DA-dominated area overall.
According to his logic, the eviction of the Ndebele squatter/tenants would return Doornkop to its status as an exclusive Pedi enclave. The DA would then make political capital by asking the ANC government 'isn't this an example of a Volkstaat? You have allowed it here, yet you deny us Afrikaners the right to have ethnically separate communities'.
These protagonists in the squatter scenario describe a series of rapid political shifts over the period since the second elections in 1999. Their statements and attitudes suggest that the ANC at local level -and in a Municipal ward where it was currently in the minority -had been refigured so thoroughly by local interests and the perception of local voter priorities that it was pursuing policies distinct from those it was advocating at the level of government. Surely this can be the only way to explain why a party which was nationally pursuing a project to put ownership of land and other assets into private ownership and distance itself from welfarist functions, was locally invoked as the defender of the destitute against property interests?
The national and local levels were not, however, as disarticulated as this might suggest.
Such was the opinion of another of the owners, Naape Setoaba. He pointed to the ANC's need to appease, and hence attract and maintain voter backing from, those who formerly supported the ethnically-based homeland governments in the old South Africa. He was -in his own description -a 'loyal member of the ANC': a fact which contradicted tenant claims of owner collusion with the opposition DA. He was nonetheless astutely perceptive about -even critical of -his party's ploy.
In 1993 when we were moving towards elections, there was an Ndebele party called Intando ya Sizwe. Near Nelspruit, where we had had KaNgwane [the Swazi ethnic bantustan], there was Enos Mabuza and his Swazi party. As we approached the elections, the ANC wanted to swallow these parties, and give positions to some of these Bantustan leaders. So Enos Mabuza and James Mahlangu [the Ndebele leader] both got positions in the government. … Because the ANC in Mpumalanga Province mainly consists of these two pre-existing parties, we had to appease them and give them positions. The Pedi here are very few. The Ndebele are in the majority; there are Swazi too. We need their votes. conjures up the particularistic ethnic sentiments which the old South Africa had been so notorious for emphasising. To revive communities' ownership of lands was, it seemed, to invite the renewal of ethno-nationalism: a process which was reinforced when the ruling party tried to strengthen its support base through ethnic forms of mobilization. When
Ndebele shack-dwellers, located at the core of a heterogenous assortment of landless people, railed against the immorality of ethnic exclusivism and claimed that 'the land is for all', they were tapping into historical memories about Ndebele entitlement to broad swathes of the Highveld. The ANC, by playing into this strategy, would not be acting in such a way as to transcend ethnically-based claims: or to 'build a nation'. Instead, through forms of mass ethnic mobilisation, it appeared to be acting against the minority ethnic groups from amongst whose elites it had earlier drawn its key support.
Conclusion
Nevertheless, in one sense, the 'nation-building project' was proving successful. The poor were being kept on board by the party for whom they had cast their votes in South Africa's landmark democratic elections in 1994. But the 'manufacturing of consent' was not serving to create racial and national unity. Rather, the interests of better-and worseoff voters were here diverging. These interests were fragmenting along the lines of class which reinforced those of real or imagined ethnic identification. It was on the level of this local-level balkanisation, rather than in any broader image of national unity, that the future for Doornkop's inhabitants was later to be sought. Despite the impassioned pleas being made by local ANC councillors such as Piet Tlou on behalf of the poor, the solution to Doornkop's 'squatter problem' was being sought beyond the realm of politics. It was being looked for, instead, in the world of 'planning'. 60 In the process, the state was outsourcing its responsibilities to private consultants. With very little input from 'beneficiaries', and despite much opposition from amongst their number, a 'redistribution' land reform project was being hatched to house the squatters on a nearby farm bought with their combined government grants.
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This was not the only respect in which attempts were being made to outsource state functions. Conflict resolution was also being effectively privatised. The transfer of land 60 A F Robertson, People and the State: an anthropology of planned development, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1984) ; J Ferguson The Anti-Politics Machine: 'development', depoliticization and bureaucratic power in Lesotho, (Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press, 1990).
